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Abstract. This work was to investigate the forensics artifacts left by network 
attack tools within Linux and UNIX operating systems and to develop an appli-
cation called HexaFind. The application enables a forensics investigator to col-
lect the digital evidence left behind by the usage, installation or removal of spe-
cific attack tools. The main objective was to decrease the complexity of forensic 
investigations within these operating systems and to increase the detection rate 
of forensic artifacts relating to criminal or civil evidence of malicious conduct. 
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1 Introduction 
The continued and growing trend towards the frequency and severity of network at-
tacks against corporations, private individuals and even towards countries has 
prompted the development of network attack detection tools. In order to defend 
against threats, security is not only required in a pre-emptive scenario, but also ex 
post facto, whereby the criminal has been detected and the acquisition of evidence has 
begun in order to facilitate a conviction.  
Many system files within the Linux and UNIX operating systems are modified 
when different types of attack tools are used and these key incriminating files or re-
positories may be overlooked by law enforcement and forensic investigators when 
attempting to collect evidence left by a malicious user. It is also extremely useful for a 
forensic investigator to be able to identify whether an attack was perpetrated by the 
user, or whether the source of the attack came from outside and this can also be 
proved, by detailed analysis of the logs and resources within Linux. Currently there 
are only a few tools that can directly identify the use of a digital attack tool, within the 
Linux/UNIX operating system and therefore this work should help to address this 
imbalance. 
Work similar to HexaFind has been identified. Hargreaves et al. discuss a frame-
work which extracts timeline data to identify high level events using pattern matching 
[1]. An open-source tool to collect forensics evidence is proposed by Zhang et al., 
which runs on a live DVD/USB based on Linux [2]. Both of these papers include a 
discussion of Log2timeline, which is mainly a Windows based tool, but it does run on 
Linux platforms and creates a single timeline by identifying various artifacts and sus-
picious files within the file system [3]. Fsaudit is a scripted tool, written in Perl and 
created for the auditing of file system changes [4]. It has some similarities to 
HexaFind in that it highlights any suspicious changes or recently modified files. 
As a Linux system is entirely based around text, whether stored as a string or an in-
teger, all values are held within files. If it is not a file, then it is a process (which often 
cannot be interrupted). Therefore, the assumption is made, that the contents of a 
Linux/ UNIX hard drive may be enumerated easily. Strings held within files are able 
to identify compromised systems or those which had been used for attack purposes, 
by dynamically searching through every file (ignoring running processes), using spe-
cific search criteria. Results returned are based on a ratings value system using key-
words, similar to a search engine. Search engines enumerate the results, looking for 
keywords and returning hits based on their inclusion/ exclusion.  In contrast, the 
scripted application developed here uses data mining to examine the hard drive, re-
turning results based on keywords and provides them with a relevancy rating.  
The tool HexaFind was developed to assist a forensics investigator in determining 
if any digital attack tools have been used in a Linux operating system. The attack 
tools tested were Metasploit, Wireshark, Nmap, tcpdump and LOIC (Low Orbit Ion 
Cannon). By examining the system for digital fingerprints, a forensic investigator 
would be able to determine if an attack has occurred by identify the key tell-tale signs 
(digital artifacts) left behind by these tools using data mining. 
This paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology used to build 
the HexaFind application, section 3 is an overview of the application and section 4 
discusses the results obtained by running the tool after specific attacks had occurred. 
A discussion is presented in section 5 and the conclusion is found in section 6. 
2 Operational Methodology of the Application 
The application has been built using Bash (Bourne-again shell) scripting within a 
UNIX POSIX environment, working with multiple distributions. This programming 
language was chosen in order to keep the program portable, and reduce complexity. 
All results retrieved by the scripted application are based around the semantics of 
language or symbolic notation. Due to the way in which Linux creates and edits files 
attempting to find artifacts which are created, modified or deleted during the same 
time frame, but are not symbolically or semantically linked, is an inaccurate method-
ology when concerning in-vivo or recently in-vitro systems. The scripted application 
instead relies on symbolically/semantically related files which contain information 
related to the operation of the network attack tools specified by the user or by using 
the inbuilt default. Recently edited/created files are still examined, except without the 
main premise that their identification will be based around file time stamps, which are 
easily modified. Therefore, rather than identifying files/artifacts which have been 
marked as created or modified, the basis of the local search is founded instead on the 
semantic/symbolic link between the file or its content and the network tool(s) speci-
fied as the search query. The operation of the tool can be further customized by edit-
ing the symbolic word lists. These word lists are part of the program, and offer an 
internal way to customize the results seen. By using UNIX based text editors, these 
word lists can be customized and thus easily changed. 
There are four different categories of result within the filtered data set. These four 
categories comprise: OK [Safe], Warnings [Suspicious], Investigate [Malicious], and 
False [Incorrect]. The respective category relevancy ratings are shown below, where   
x is the number of matched keywords: 
 
      ,           ,      ,             (1) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. HexaFind Logic Engine Diagram 
The above ratings (1) are based on the inclusion of certain symbolic words – such 
as “port”, “attack” or “scan”. This method of analysis also tests for false positives, 
ensuring incorrect results are ignored. All keywords used by the scripted application 
can easily be edited. The results are based on a ratings value system which uses key/ 
symbolic words. For example, an integer is incremented for each additional key/ 
symbolic word that is present within the result, see Fig 1. Therefore the result in this 
case would return a ratings value of three, for the three symbolic words mentioned 
above. These are derived as follows, with the bold text indicating the specified key/ 
symbolic word:- 
 
“/./tmp/logs/attack.txt:nmap attack log. 64 hosts scanned. 443/tcp port open, vulner-
able” 
 
The logic engine used is proprietary. An argument is provided by the user (the que-
ry) for all known tools. This can be the name of a specific attack tool such as “nmap”, 
or a null string (“”). If a null string is used then all the tools specified in the default 
attack list will be included in the search. The unfiltered results are iteratively held and 
processed in a “for loop”. The loop continues until all results have been processed.  
If the string is not null, then the entries within the unfiltered results file are pro-
cessed against the contents of the current attack list. For each matching term in the 
current attack list, a relevancy rating of one star (+1) is added to the individual result. 
After this first processing stage has passed, the partially filtered result is compared 
against the keywords list, irrespective of a null query. The second stage of processing 
adds a relevancy rating of one star (+1) for each matching term in the keywords list. 
The third stage is testing for false positives. The result is compared to a false posi-
tive file, whereby specific terms are set, and any results which match have their 
“false” variable incremented and are subsequently removed from the filtered, pro-
cessed, dataset, regardless of the relevancy rating.   
The fourth stage is classification. Here, results are classified into their respective 
categories and logged to the corresponding results file. This operation continues until 
all results have been processed. This also tests for false positives, allowing for incor-
rect results to be ignored. All symbolic words used by the scripted application can 
easily be edited by the user. These results and their categories are then calculated as a 
percentage of the total. The percentages are then used to dynamically create the 3D 
pie chart via the amended 3rd party script [4]. When all the results are collated, the 
investigator is presented with the option of choosing between HTML or text output 
and the report file is dynamically generated. 
3 Overview of the Application 
The scripted application makes most use of inbuilt Linux and UNIX based command 
line packages in order to retrieve the results. This big data set is achieved through the 
use of regular expressions and widely available fundamental packages. The applica-
tion HexaFind comprises five modules which are shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. HexaFind Module Design Diagram 
 
 Main.sh – The main program module is the textual user interface. This module 
runs the other scripted modules iteratively with the user specified mode of opera-
tion, until they return an error code other than zero. If the error code is equal to ze-
ro, the main module returns to the start of execution, and waits for user input. 
 Trace.sh – The forensic fingerprinting module searches and enumerates the con-
tents of the local hard drive in order to identify the attack traces. This provides un-
filtered results, which are then converted, filtered and classified within this module.  
 Report.sh – This is the basic text reporting module, originally designed to be port-
able, which runs automatically. This module offers a textual output, which is simi-
lar to that displayed through the console to the user, making it useful for command 
line only deployments which have no access to a graphical user interface. 
 Report_html.sh – The HTML reporting module (Report_html.sh) can also be run to 
create a HTML formatted output. It runs the 3rd party 3D pie chart scripted module 
in order to simplify and visualize the dataset. 
 Pie3d_v2.sh – A 3rd party 3D pie chart creation script [5] has been modified to 
enable the investigator to visualize the results. This is run by the HTML reporting 
module, but can be run independently. However, data is required to first be placed 
into a structured text file in order to define the visual layout of the 3D pie chart. 
4 Results from HexaFind 
A number of tests were performed by attacking the server using commonly available 
attack tools (Metasploit, Wireshark, Nmap, tcpdump and LOIC). The results from 
HexaFind are presented below.  
 
 
[==========HexaFind:Trace Result #44=========] 
/./tmp/msfe-nmap20130102-30793-1s8ajiu:</nmaprun> 
Current Tool: nmap (1) 
Current Keyword: msfe (1) 
Current result:45 has a relevancy rating of [**] 2 stars 
[ OK ] 
Fig. 3. An OK [Safe] Result 
Fig. 3 shows an OK result, as it has only achieved a relevancy rating of 2 stars. 
This therefore this will be classified as a safe result [OK]. The result shown details the 
use of the Metasploit Framework Environment or “msfe” used in conjunction with 
Nmap. 
 
 
[==========HexaFind:Trace Result #85=========] 
/./tmp/bitrock_installer_13595.log:Uninstalling /opt/metasploit-
4.5.0/common/share/nmap/nselib/data/snmpcommunities.lst... 
Current Tool: nmap (1) 
Current Keyword: snmp (1) 
Current Keyword: log (2) 
Current result:86 has a relevancy rating of [***] 3 stars 
[ WARNING ] 
Fig. 4. A Warning [Suspicious] Result 
A warning is shown in Fig. 4, which is the result of one matching attack tool 
(“nmap”) and two matching keywords (“snmp” and “log”) being filtered from the 
processed string. 
[==========HexaFind:Trace Result #43=========] 
/./tmp/msfe-nmap20130102-30793-1s8ajiu:<runstats><finished time="1357136502" 
timestr="Wed Jan  2 14:21:42 2013" elapsed="188.73" summary="Nmap done at Wed Jan  
2 14:21:42 2013; 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 188.73 seconds" ex-
it="success"/><hosts up="1" down="0" total="1"/> 
Current Tool: nmap (1) 
Current Keyword: ip (1) 
Current Keyword: msfe (2) 
Current Keyword: host (3) 
Current Keyword: scan (4) 
Current result:44 has a relevancy rating of [*****] 5 stars 
[ INVESTIGATE ] 
 
Fig. 5. An Investigate [Malicious] Result 
Fig. 5 shows a malicious result that has been detected due to the query specified 
(attack tool name = nmap), in addition to the four separate keywords that have been 
found, which are “ip”, “msfe”, “host” and “scan”. 
[==========HexaFind:Trace Result #746=========] 
/./opt/metasploit-4.5.0/common/lib/python2.5/site-
packages/zenmapGUI/TopologyPage.py:# ***********************IMPORTANT NMAP LICENSE 
TERMS************************ 
Current Tool: nmap (1) 
Current Keyword: port (1) 
Current Keyword: log (2) 
Current result:747 has a relevancy rating of [***] 3 stars 
[ FALSE POSITIVE ] 
Fig. 6. A False Positive [Incorrect] Result 
Fig. 6 illustrates an incorrect result, due to the term “.py:” being specified within 
the false positive input file. The string “.py:” indicates the presence of a Python script, 
and so this was removed, as large numbers of false positive results were being gener-
ated. If identified as a false positive, then the current result is appended to the false 
positive list, overriding any previous decisions made.  
A sample section of the final report is shown in Fig. 7. As can be seen, the details 
of the investigator, with dates and times, are included, along with the total number of 
results analysed and a dynamically generated 3D pie chart of the attacks identified. 
This gives a high level overview of the current report and its findings. The HTML 
report is easier for the investigator to read.  
 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 7. HexaFind HTML Report 
5 Discussion 
Often attackers do not think about the long term consequences of their actions and the 
possible repercussions. Although those that do will often take precautionary measures 
in order to hide files from view or remove them entirely. This is due to the datum that 
the implementation of relatively simple techniques could ultimately be able to hide 
relevant important facts from system administrators or forensic investigators. Even 
being able to replace keywords in a system would cause problems for this project, as 
most of the algorithms that are implemented are based on information that is stored 
textually throughout the system. If the attacker is technically skilled they may be able 
to alter critical evidential information that is held within the system. Log items can be 
extremely helpful and they are often the only piece of information which connects an 
attack to a computer or user. If the log files are successfully erased from the comput-
er, then it will make the investigator’s job of proving that an attack was initiated near 
impossible. Therefore any small changes that occur to a system must also be account-
ed for. Even the smallest detail may assist in convicting a suspect of tampering with 
log files or system files. 
Using shell scripts, and particularly Bash, makes the system highly portable, as the 
scripts do not need to be compiled for each heterogeneous system environment.  
The big data sets used were often over one hundred times the physical size of the 
original application, and therefore a key requirement was efficiency. Another issue 
encountered was being able to accurately process each individual result and pipe the 
data stream to the other scripted applications to effectively process the unfiltered orig-
inal results.  
6 Conclusion 
HexaFind is a scripted tool that can assist investigators in aggregating and elucidating 
key information from a big data set. The objective was to develop a systematic meth-
odology for identifying offensive digital attack tools and the digital artifacts that they 
leave when they are run on a Linux system. This can be used to successfully prove 
that a particular attack tool had been used. Working with Linux/ Unix POSIX systems 
has provided an extremely flexible environment to work in. This also meant that the 
application could be used across a wide variety of distributions without changes being 
required for each different system. A future development will be to expand the num-
ber of attack tools included within the tool. HexaFind is distributed through the use of 
a dedicated development website, which can be found at http://www.hexafind.com/. 
Since opening it has consistently received over 1,500 hits per week. 
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